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Data, Ideology, and the Developing Critical Program of Social Informatics 
Michael Marcinkowski 
 
Abstract 
 
The rapidly shifting ideological terrain of computing has a profound impact on Social Informatics’s 
critical and empirical analysis of computerization movements. As these movements incorporate 
many of the past critiques concerning social fit and situational context levelled against them by 
Social Informatics research, more subtle and more deeply ingrained modes of ideological practice 
have risen to support movements of computerization. Among these, the current emphasis on the 
promises of data and data analytics presents the most obvious ideological challenge. In order to 
reorient Social Informatics in relation to these new ideological challenges, Louis Althusser’s theory of 
ideology is discussed, with its implications for Social Informatics considered. Among these 
implications, a changed relationship between Social Informatics’s critical stance and its reliance on 
empirical methods is advanced. Addressed at a fundamental level, the practice of Social Informatics 
comes to be reoriented in a more distinctly reflective and ethical direction. 
 
Introduction 
 
Critical appraisal of the ideological presuppositions surrounding movements of computerization has 
been a central concern in the work of  Social  Informatics  for  some  time (Day, 2007; Elliott & 
Kraemer, 2008; Kling & Iacono, 1988, 1990). Such critique has contributed to the now-widespread 
acknowledgment of  the  relation  between  technical  and social paradigms in the success or failure 
of the deployment of computer systems and other forms of information communication  technology  
(ICT)  (Ackerman,  2000;  Norman, 2010; Sawyer & Jarrahi, 2014). Most often, these critiques focus  
on  the  social  malformation  of  technical  systems—malformations discounted or ignored in part 
because of the ideological enthusiasm for the sheer technical possibilities of  a  system  and  the  
seemingly  universal  claims  made  by computational technology (Day, 2007; Kling, 2000). 
 
As Social Informatics and related approaches (Computer Supported   Cooperative   Work   [CSCW],   
human-centered computing, etc.) have successfully pressed for understanding the social and 
technical aspects of ICT as an inseparable sociotechnical amalgam and thereby diffusing much of the 
ideological  pressures  of  previous  decades,  new  modes  of ideological  discourse  have  developed  
as  proxy  for  these seemingly deflated forms. Where in the 1980s and 1990s the ideological  
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exhortation  might  have  been  a  more  general “you need a computer,” the exhortation today is 
different. Although  ideological  and  monolithic  movements  of  personal computing have dissolved 
into a menagerie of different   movements,   each   shaped   by   their   own   particular constitution  
and  aims  (Hara  &  Rosenbaum,  2008),  there remains in the background of many of these 
movements a consideration  of  the  possibilities  and  pitfalls  of  a  more general  concern  for  data,  
specifically  its  collection  and analysis toward useful insight. Just as computerization could 
previously  be  touted  as  a  central  palliative  to  seemingly intractable  problems,  data  analysis  is  
now  likewise  presented  as  a  catch-all  solution  to  a  host  of  complex  issues (boyd & Crawford, 
2012; Callebaut, 2012). 
 
Even as the rhetoric has changed from basic computerization  to  data  analysis,  computerization  
nevertheless  still remains at the center of the ideological bulwark now focused on  the  imperatives  
of  data.  Whereas  previous  regimes  of computerization were critiqued based on the largely unful- 
filled promise of the benefits and possibilities of computing (Kling, 2007; Kling & Iacono, 1988), 
today’s emphasis on the benefits and possibilities of large sets of data (Mayer-Schönberger  &  
Cukier,  2013)  serves  to  both  continue and replicate the ideological conditions of computerization 
under a different banner. From examples such as the quantified self for health (Murdoch & Detsky, 
2013; Swan, 2009), to  education  (Long  &  Siemens,  2011;  Picciano, 2012), to big data biology 
(Howe et al., 2008), to data-driven social science (Manovich, 2012), the prospects of data are  
presented in such a way (whether rightly or wrongly) that continues the ideological project 
supported by the original computerization  movements  that  pressed  for  the  unquestioned 
benefits of computerization in the workplace, school, and home (Kling & Iacono, 1988). 
 
Within this complex ideological network of both computerization and data analytics, the Social 
Informatics-inspired questions  of  effect  (Kling,  1991)  and  social-technical  fit (Ackerman, 2000) 
are joined by more nuanced questions of the  development  of  aims  and  reproduction  of  the  
initial conditions of computerization itself. Given this, it is necessary to expand on the kind of 
ideological diagnosis provided by  Social  Informatics  and  look  more  closely  at  the  structured  
formations  that  produce  and  sustain  the  relationship between basic computerization and its 
current emphasis on the potential for data analysis. Relying on a conception of ideology  developed  
in the work of Althusser (2001), this article  will  trace the implications of this shifting ideological 
terrain on the work of Social Informatics as it engages with movements of  computerization.  In  
doing so, the critical and empirical foundations of Social Informatics  (Kling,  2007;  Sawyer  &  
Rosenbaum,  2000)  will  be evaluated. 
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Such a relationship between Social Informatics and the work of Althusser is not without precedent, 
as Rob Kling, in his  foundational  role  in  establishing  the  version  of  Social Informatics  and  
ideologies  of  computerization  discussed here,  frequently  acknowledged  the  influence  of  
scholars engaged with the work of Althusser (such as Poster, 1974) (Cronin & Shaw, 2007; Day, 2007) 
and at times used what could  be  considered  explicitly  Althusserian  terminology, speaking  of  
“ideologies”  of  computing  while  performing “symptomatic  readings”  of  the  context  
surrounding  such ideologies (Kling & Iacono, 1988, 1990), each term finding development in 
Althusser and Balibar’s (2009; 2001) writings. In tracing these connections, it must be explicitly 
stated that the singular image of Social Informatics considered in this article is one which finds its 
identity at the confluence of Kling’s interest in Social Informatics (2000, 2007) and computerization 
movements (Kling & Iacono, 1988, 1990)1. 
 
In  an  article  that  hopes  to  argue  for  some  theoretical underpinning to Social Informatics, it 
should also be immediately highlighted that there are wide patches of agreement that  Social  
Informatics  is explicitly  not  a  theory  itself (Sawyer,  2006;  Sawyer  &  Eschenfelder,  2005;  Sawyer  
& Rosenbaum, 2000). This determination is made at the same time  that  Social  Informatics  is  said  
to  be  hospitable  to  a number of theories (Lamb & Sawyer, 2005; Sawyer, 2006; Sawyer  &  
Rosenbaum,  2000)  and  is  able  to  sustain  them within its bounds. That is, Social Informatics is 
conceived of as an area of research that is defined by what it studies and not  by  any  particular  
theoretical  orientation.  However,  as Kling (1980) noted early in the development of what came to 
be Social Informatics: “[t]o identify the social impacts of computing, one must have, at least 
implicitly, a theory of the causal  powers  that  computerized  systems  can  exert  upon individuals,  
groups,  organizations,  institutions,  social  networks, social worlds, and other social entities” (p. 62). 
As will be argued, an explicit Althusserian theory of ideology provides at least part of such an implicit 
understanding of the relation between computing and social forms. 
 
Centrally, the contribution of this article is to address and re-evaluate  the  fundamental  
philosophical  basis  of  how Social  Informatics  might  approach  a  critique  of  ideology today in 
light of the developing relationship between computerization and society. Building on established 
                                                          
1
 The question of the possibility of a singular analysis of a discipline as vast and multi-faceted as Social 
Informatics presents a distinct challenge, particularly  when  addressing  it  by  way  of  a  philosophical  
tradition (Althusser bridging the historical divide between structuralism and post- structuralism)  which  resists  
such  easy  individuation  (Day,  2005).  Here, even as a constrained consideration of Social Informatics’s critical 
analysis of computerization movements is at stake, there remains the risk of some distorting totalization,  
though  cognizance  of  this  possibility  contributes greatly to the avoidance of any insurmountable damage. 
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analysis of the  implications  of  big  data  (boyd  &  Crawford,  2012; Callebaut,   2012;   Floridi,   
2012;   etc.),   the   paradigmatic framing  for  Social  Informatics’s  analysis  of  ideologies  of 
computing is examined and re-oriented. As such, this work is cast as a fundamental and pre-
methodological consideration of how  the  scientific  work  of  Social  Informatics  is 
constituted. It analyzes the tacit and conceptual conditions that provide the basic forms and 
epistemic veracity for the work of Social Informatics’s own methodological analysis of ideology in 
computing. 
 
In  mapping  this  new  ideological  terrain  in  which  the possibilities  of  data  come  to  overshadow  
any  immediate ideologies of computation, two main thematic implications for Social Informatics will 
be drawn out. First, as already noted, is the possibility of using Althusser’s theory of ideology as a 
philosophically grounded lens through which we can  understand  the  ideological  challenges  faced  
by  Social Informatics  today.  Second,  in  developing  this  theoretical framing  for  Social  
Informatics’s  approach  to  ideology,  a central  methodological  claim  of  Social  Informatics—that 
empirical investigations can provide insight into ideological discourses—will be examined and an 
alternate paradigm of critical theoretical practice will be considered. This comes as an expansion of 
the broadly critical foundations of Social Informatics have already been sketched out, albeit in 
different terms (Day, 2007), with similar implications. At bottom, the result is to cast Social 
Informatics as a mode of Althusserian theoretical practice, thus clarifying and expanding on the 
definition and possibilities for future Social Informatics research. 
 
The Ideological Project of Social Informatics 
 
Critical strains of Social Informatics were developed in the face of what were considered to be 
untested claims for the prospects and possibilities of computing that had been made by those both 
inside and outside of the field of computing (Kling, 1980, 2007; Kling & Iacono, 1988). As Kling saw it, 
the problem with these computer-centric “ideological” discourses was their lack of any empirically 
proven basis for their claims regarding the effect and effectiveness of certain applications of 
computing. It worked toward a critical analysis of the “‘uncritical’ statements and narratives 
divorced from ‘empirical’ reality” (Day, 2007, p.577) that were produced in support of 
computerization. In this, Social Informatics was conceived of as a means to push back against 
deterministic strains of thought that were initially pervasive in the widespread adoption of 
computers (Kling, 2000) and emphasize the historically situated nature of any claims made about 
computing. 
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Having achieved more than a small measure of success and faced with new and more pervasive 
questions about computing, Social Informatics seems to now be in the process of outgrowing its 
initial formulation with its widening range of discussions and interventions. Despite (or perhaps 
because of) a string of published definitions and redefinitions (Kling, 2007; Lamb & Sawyer, 2005; 
Sawyer, 2006; Sawyer & Eschenfelder, 2005; Sawyer & Jarrahi, 2014; Sawyer & Rosenbaum, 2000; 
Sawyer & Tapia, 2007; Sawyer & Tyworth, 2006), Social Informatics faces a wide array of 
interpretations of what it is as a practice, and how it should be defined. Indeed, many discussions 
(Bradley, 2006; Day, 2007) begin to press against the decidedly empirical origins of Social 
Informatics’s critique of ideology and raise new questions about how the field should operate in light 
of its own self-definition and goals. 
 
Despite this ambiguity in definition and method, one central theme of Social Informatics can be 
traced to a particular concern over the way we understood and were compelled by various 
“computerization movements” (Elliott & Kraemer, 2008; Kling & Iacono, 1988, 1990). As Kling and 
Iacono (1988) put it in their initial formulation: “[o]ur main thesis is that computerization 
movements communicate key ideological beliefs about the links between computerization and a 
preferred social order that helps legitimize computerization for many potential adopters” (p. 227). 
Looking back from the present to 1988 when this thesis was put forward makes such a statement 
seem both prophetic and quaint. The ideologies supporting the adoption of computation in various 
sectors seems to have been so successful that the question of computerization and social order is no 
longer a legitimate question: Computerization, the social order, and the ideologies that support a 
connection between the two have largely converged. In contrast to 1988, computerization has 
become the default stance even beyond the kind of fundamental areas of the computerization 
movements initially examined by Kling and Iacono (1988) (urban planning, artificial intelligence, 
education, office automation, and personal computing), spreading to agriculture (Wang, Zhang, & 
Wang, 2006), health (Bath, 2008), and even literature (Clement, 2008) and beyond. 
 
At the same time, thanks in part to work done under the banner of Social Informatics, the 
colonization of areas of human activity by computerization has not been an asymmetrical 
movement. The call pressed forward by Social Informatics and related fields to include a 
consideration of the lived, social, and historically motivated conditions surrounding computer use as 
part of the incorporation of computing into such a variety of human tasks has not been ignored. If 
anything, the critiques offered by Social Informatics have given the proponents of an ideological 
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picture of computing recourse when confronted with the breakdown of the optimistic vision of 
computing on which they relied (Kling, 2007). Instead of being presented as a default and immediate 
palliative in any situation, computerization is now understood as being reliant on a concern for the 
social and human forms with which it interacts. Indeed, forms of computerization have taken on 
many of the organizing principles of our social existences (think of social networking [Weaver & 
Morrison, 2008] or ubiquitous computing [Ackerman, 2008], with each case being founded on basic 
ideas of human social organization). The ideological logic of the “links between computerization and 
a preferred social order” (Kling & Iacono, 1988, p. 227) has been tempered, though not relinquished 
entirely. 
 
In many respects, despite this overarching sense of mutual convergence and the evidence that the 
warnings of Social Informatics have been taken to heart, the present state is such that the initial 
ideologies of computerization critiqued in Social Informatics have, to put it in blunt and somewhat 
overstated terms, won. The value of computerization is no longer questioned in the same manner as 
it was at the advent of Social Informatics (as a question of whether there should be more or less 
computerization in any given setting [Kling, 2007]). Although the question of how computer systems 
and ICT should be designed and deployed with respect to social forms is important today in a 
manner inconceivable at the outset of Social Informatics, equally inconceivable today is the question 
of whether computer systems should be used for any number of tasks. The answer is, of course, a 
resounding “yes.” Ideologies of computerization as critiqued by Social Informatics have incorporated 
the call for attention to social factors, while still succeeding to “legitimize computerization for many 
potential adopters”(Kling & Iacono, 1988, p. 227). 
 
This sublimation by movements of computerization of a critique of their ideological stance as 
rendered by Social Informatics (and other fields) can be understood in terms of both a positive 
development (Social Informatics has achieved some measure of success) and as a mode of 
hegemonic allowance (ideologies of computerization assented to certain considerations of existing 
social forms as a means toward the furtherance of their own goals). This symbiotic state of affairs 
does not mean that the work of Social Informatics is complete or relegated to a virtual holding 
pattern. As the critique developed by Social Informatics and related disciplines has demonstrated, 
computerization is not a foregone conclusion able to sustain itself only on its own terms: within the 
ideological stance of computerization movements today exists this sublimated kernel of social, 
historical, and cultural critique as introduced by Social Informatics. 
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Dataization Movements 
 
If the critical work started in Social Informatics is to continue and if we continue to believe that one 
of its core aims is working to uncover the ideological distortions set in motion by movements of 
computerization, it is necessary to look beyond the original sites of such ideologies and to examine 
them as they have shifted and been transformed. Although numerous such sites exist (Hara & 
Rosenbaum, 2008), attention here will be given to the ideological forms surrounding the rise of data 
analytics in its various forms. As will be discussed, what I term “dataization movements” serve to 
play a fundamental role in supporting the continuation of the ideological work of the original 
computerization movements. This comes as dataization movements display a cross-cutting thematic 
relevance to computing in general and an advocacy for certain ontological and epistemic conditions 
(boyd & Crawford, 2012; Callebaut, 2012; Floridi, 2012). In this continuation, the new ideological 
formation surrounding the uses of data is founded on the necessary conditions set forward by 
previous computerization movements. In turn, based on this reliance, dataization movements 
support the replication of basic computerization. Here, the already-diagnosed implications of the 
rise of dataization on foundational epistemic questions (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Callebaut, 2012; 
Floridi, 2012) provides a fulcrum for understanding the developing conditions faced by Social 
Informatics research into far-reaching ideological concerns. 
 
As a leading example of the potential reach of a data-driven ideology, the advertised potential for 
the application of big data (however variously and imprecisely defined [boyd & Crawford, 2012; 
Hendler, 2013; Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013]) to any number of problem domains relies on a 
commitment to certain ontological and epistemological framings in which data’s ability to disclose 
the truth of a situation by sifting through the available empirical and quantifiable evidence is 
assumed. Such a positivistic approach presents deeply ingrained presuppositions regarding the 
power of data analytics over the role of human cognition or the influence of any particular historical 
condition for the determination of meaningful truth (Anderson, 2008; Callebaut, 2012). The 
proffered benefits of the implementation of such systems of data analytics brings along a set of 
background commitments necessary for its implementation that reshape larger domains. In this 
case, there is an alignment of data analytics, its largely positivist epistemology, and the possibilities 
of insight and truth. 
 
It is these sorts of epistemic and ontological commitments that lay the groundwork for further and 
more wide-reaching modes of social organization beyond the immediate questions of data analysis. 
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As techniques of data analytics are applied to learning (Long & Siemens, 2011), biology (Callebaut, 
2012), enterprise (Lavalle, Lesser, Shockley, Hopkins, & Kruschwitz, 2011), and beyond (Mayer-
Schönberger & Cukier, 2013), each area comes, rightly or wrongly, to be a central site for the 
replication of the ideological position according to which it is judged. By engaging in data-analytic 
approaches, the terms and problematics of these fields are, in quarters where such approaches are 
seriously applied, confined to certain epistemic understandings (the use of quantified data, for 
example) and certain ontological positions (positive-mechanical, for example). 
 
Unlike the original computerization movements (Kling & Iacono, 1988) and the generations that 
followed (Elliott & Kraemer, 2008), ideologies of data have aims that lay beyond sheer adoption. 
Unlike computerization, the use of data analytics requires ontological and epistemic commitments 
that go beyond a belief in productivity and, in many ways, offer computerization longer-lasting 
ideological support than the original argument for computerization alone can bring. The colonization 
of discourses by data-centric ideological movements sets the stage for the reproduction of both 
these ideologies of data and of the modes of computerization on which they rely. Given this complex 
relationship between previous ideologies of computerization and newer ideologies of data, Social 
Informatics is pressed to re-evaluate its understandings of the implications of ideology in a radical 
way. 
 
Toward Theoretical Social Informatics 
 
The version of Social Informatics presented here so far is particular to a U.S. version of Social 
Informatics, one which is largely descended from the work of Kling (2007) himself and that “is 
defined by its topic (and fundamental questions about it)” (p. 205). Other strains of Social 
Informatics take on a slightly different character. For instance, European varieties of Social 
Informatics consider it to be a mode of data-driven sociological study or as the application of ICT to 
social or governmental projects (Vehovar, 2006). In this, European variants share both the empirical 
and sociotechnical orientations of U.S. varieties, and as a result appear very similar. Yet, they still 
remain distinct for reasons beyond geography. So what then, if neither topic nor the empirical 
emphasis distinguishes the two strains, still allows their research programs to appear distinct? 
 
The key is found in the parenthetical Kling (2007) appends to his statement regarding Social 
Informatics’s definition by topic in which he clarifies that it is not just the topic itself but also 
“fundamental questions about it” (p.205) that defines his variety of Social Informatics. In this, a 
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distinguishing feature of Social Informatics becomes one of its own internal problematic, questioning 
the nature of the topic itself. Such a critical approach toward the constitution of a problematic—one 
which deals not in a humanistic-emancipatory rhetoric, but rather with a critical analysis of a 
problematic—follows a distinctly Althusserian theoretical position founded on a similar critical 
approach toward the development of a new problematic (Althusser & Balibar, 2009). 
 
What comes to be apparent is that the topic of Social Informatics is not so much either technology 
or society (or even both together), but rather is about the conceptualization of the relationship 
between the two and a critical diagnosis of its meaning. The empirical position of Social Informatics 
becomes complicated by such a critical stance in that “the empirical objects of Social Informatics can 
be as much conceptual constructs as empirical entities, and second, that Social Informatics’s central 
concern is the examination of the notion of information as a culturally and historically specific 
conception of knowledge” (Day, 2007, p. 576). Such is explicitly the case when looking at the sort of 
ideologies and computerization movements that form the main site of critique for Social Informatics. 
By opening its methodological possibilities to include consideration of conceptual constructs and the 
possibility of their historical shaping, there is already an initial shift in the purposes of Social 
Informatics away from the strict subject–object divide, which normally maintains empiricism’s 
sensuous relationship between objects and our ability to know them. 
 
Faced with these concerns regarding both its problematic and empirical method, Social Informatics 
turns explicitly theoretical and engages the question of Social Informatics itself—and the diagnosis 
of its problematic and its function—as part of its critical mission. The central concern for Social 
Informatics becomes one of theoretical framing and development: How are we to critically approach 
questions of the relationship between technology and society? What are the terms for 
understanding the ideologies surrounding movements of both computerization and data? In order to 
sustain such a critical emphasis, it becomes necessary to develop a theoretical understanding of the 
relationship between society and technology, which accounts for their mutual influence (a 
theoretical necessity that Kling (1980) himself endorsed). At the same time it is necessary to have a 
theoretical understanding of how (if at all) an empirical approach can be used to build reasoned 
arguments about both conceptual and sociotechnological phenomena. In order to flesh out what 
this larger theoretical problematic at the heart of Social Informatics’s analysis of ideology may look 
like, I will turn to a brief introduction to the philosophical work of Althusser. 
 
Althusser’s Social Theory 
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Founded on a radical re-reading of Marx, Althusser offered an attempt toward a “comprehensive 
theory of the ‘social’” (DiTomaso, 1982, p. 15). Taking an anti-humanist stance, Althusser’s work 
stands in stark contrast to strains of humanistically derived critical theory. Not concerned with any 
sense of humanistic emancipation, Althusser looked to define a process of social influence and 
historical progression visible without the influence of any particular historically situated subject. 
Developing his philosophical work from Marx’s original base/superstructure model, which pro- 
posed that the material (economic) base is determinant of the ideological or political 
superstructures, Althusser proposed a structured model of social influence, which, unlike Marx’s 
model, allowed for a reciprocal arrangement of influence (Poster, 1974). At any given time, any level 
of practice (ideological, political, or economic) could function as the “structure in dominance” 
(Althusser, 2005), with an ultimate reliance on the economic base coming only in the last instance 
(which may or may not arrive or ever be called to exert its influence). In this schema, social structure 
is a lived-thing, formed out of the active relationships and practices in which individuals take part. In 
their autonomous operation, it is possible for these levels of practice to stand in contradiction to one 
or both of the other levels, leading to the overdetermination of social structure as it is constituted by 
multiple, sometimes overlapping forces. As a result of this overdetermination, there may be 
instances of uneven development in which “the different overdeterminations at different times and 
places results in quite different patterns of social development” (Althusser, 2005, p. 250). It is worth 
noting that this theoretical model of social structuring provides support for many of the key findings 
of Social Informatics (Lamb & Sawyer, 2005; Ortiz, Herlau, & Rasmussen, 2006; Sawyer & 
Eschenfelder, 2005; Sawyer & Rosenbaum, 2000), which point to the uneven and overdetermined 
effects of computing. 
 
Ideology and Social Informatics 
Turning to the question of ideology, for Althusser (2001), ideology is understood as “an imaginary 
relation to real relations,” which “is itself endowed with a material existence” (p. 113), saying that 
“there is no practice except by and in an ideology,” and that “there is no ideology except by the 
subject and for subjects” (p. 115). In this definition, Althusser distinguishes his understanding of 
ideology from older mechanistic and hermeneutic interpretations of ideology, proffering a definition 
that is at the same time imaginary and material, based in practice and inextricably linked to the 
definition of the subject. For Althusser, ideology is given a quasi-ontological character. Older modes 
of ideology are given only ideal formulation—either as false image propagated by a controlling figure 
(as in the example of the despot or priest) or, following a more traditional reading of Marx, an 
Page 11 of 24 
 
interpretive papering over of the alienating material conditions of existence with some more 
acceptable image. They are linked to belief more than to practice, and are directed toward 
ideological imputation of the subject, not its ideological constitution. 
 
In many respects, these previous approaches to ideology critiqued by Althusser correspond to the 
forms of ideology associated with earlier analysis of movements of computerization. For example, a 
traditional account of ideological influence can be seen in the way in which those with a vested 
interest in the expansion of computing (computer companies, programmers, computer scientists, 
technologists, etc.) argued for and advertised an ideal image of computation. Similarly, office 
workers and others whose work might have been able to take advantage of computing presented 
themselves with an image of the liberating possibilities of computing. Despite the success of these 
models of ideology in diagnosing earlier forms of computerization movements, the widespread 
epistemic and ontological implications of data-centric ideological movements call for a different 
mode of analysis that extends beyond these mechanistic and hermeneutic modes of ideology. 
For Althusser, the function of ideology is more universally given than the propagation of a particular 
social organization or particular sense of productivity. It is not reliant on any external imputation, 
but is instead sustained by individual practice. More than just an idealization, ideology is seen as 
being bound up in material and very real practices, avoiding any association with either internal ideal 
notions of ideology or external repressive force. As Žižek (1994) puts it: 
 
When Althusser repeats, after Pascal: “Act as if you believe, pray, kneel down, and you shall believe, 
faith will arrive by itself,” he delineates an intricate reflexive mechanism of retro- active 
“autopoetic” foundation that far exceeds the reduction is  assertion of the dependence of inner 
belief on external behavior. (p. 12) 
 
 
In Althusser’s schema, the material practice of ideology exceeds any need for ideological belief, with 
such practice finding its foundation in its being bound up in the ideological structures we have built 
and continue to reinforce with our behavior. The model of ideology that Althusser sets out goes 
beyond “the communication of key ideological beliefs” (Kling & Iacono, 1988, p. 227) in 
computerization as critiqued by Social Informatics and looks toward the habituation of practice even 
at an ontological and epistemological level. 
 
In focusing on practice rather than on ideal discourse, Althusser’s theory of ideology accounts for 
how our uses of data and the practices that surround it (education, health, enterprise, etc.) do not 
rely on any kind of epistemic belief in their power, only their material effect. As in the allusion to 
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Pascal, we do not need to believe in data, we only need to clasp a fitness tracker around our wrist, 
submit our data points, and the ideological effects will come of their own accord. It does not matter 
if we believe in the power of data analytics, only that they work when put into practice. Dataization 
movements do not rely on belief in order to reproduce their ideological positions; they rely instead 
on a more deeply ingrained practical engagement. As data analysis comes to be a central method for 
veridiction, its ideological position is upheld through its use as arbiter, not any impressed belief. 
 
Computerization, as it has insinuated itself into other, economic activities in such a pervasive way, 
loses (though perhaps not entirely) its ideological character and comes to function as the kind of 
material and economic base that founds the structure of Marxian analysis. Following Althusser’s 
model of social structure, while functioning independently, such an economic material base of 
computation supports the ideological superstructure of dataization, with either directing the form of 
the larger structure until the “last instance” in which the material structures of computerization 
determine the structure of the larger social form. Because of this final reliance of the ideological 
superstructure on the material base, the ideological reproduction of movements of dataization 
support and re-instantiate the material practices advocated for in the original movements of 
computerization. An ideological movement toward data analysis eclipses, and in turn supports, 
previous models of material computational practice. 
 
In linking ideological practice to the reproduction of the material base of computing, this rendering 
goes beyond the sense that ideologies, as Kling and Iacono (1988) put it, “set adopters’ expectations 
about what they should use computing for and how they should organize access to it” (p. 227). 
Instead, an Althusserian account of ideology looks toward the ingrained material practices that 
constitute belief and expectation, drilling down to the more fundamental material basis of ideologies 
of computerization and data analytics. For Social Informatics, this changed state of affairs has 
important implications for the ways in which research into ideology is to be understood and 
conducted, particularly regarding the empirical subject. 
 
Ideological Consequences of Empiricism 
 
The relationship between ideology and the subject is not a trivial one. As Althusser (2001) 
formulates it, 
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the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add 
that the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the 
function (which defines it) of “constituting” concrete individuals as subjects. (p. 116) 
 
 
As characterized by Althusser, this invocation of the ideological subject links the always-already 
existent figure of ideology to the constitution of the subject who in turn constitutes ideology 
through their engagement with ideological practices. 
 
This connection between the existence of the subject and ideology is one that poses a serious 
question regarding the way in which Social Informatics approaches the question of ideology. If 
empiricism is founded upon the relationship between a subject and an object, then empirical work 
would have to be considered, at base, to be ideological rather than scientific. That is, by defining the 
sensing subject of empiricism, the ideological movements analyzed by Social Informatics would in 
turn define the work of empiricism itself. This is directly evident in looking at ideologies of data 
analysis, which call to be critiqued—in a reflexive fashion—by empirical modes of data analysis. Any 
empirical formulation of Social Informatics which seeks to address the questions surrounding the 
ideological movements of computerization and data faces a reflexive challenge: How may the 
empirical tools that are put to use avoid the ideological influence of the subject? If the conceptual 
categories and evidence utilized as part of empirical Social Informatics research are founded on our 
being subject to an ideology of computerization movements or data analytics (or other ideological 
movement), how can they begin to be used as fulcrum for the further critical work of Social 
Informatics? 
 
Contrasting his notion of ideological practice with a non-ideological “theoretical” practice, Althusser 
(2005) opens the discussion of how Social Informatics may critique ideological structures without 
relying on an empirical methodology that is no longer able to sustain such critique. Instead of relying 
on empirical examination as the basis for the generation of nonideological knowledge, Althusser’s 
theoretical practice conceives of scientific work as the movement of ideological thought toward 
theoretical knowledge by means of theoretical practice. In this way, the object of knowledge is not 
necessarily constituted by the object itself, but rather by a process termed “the knowledge effect” 
by Althusser (2005), by which the object becomes known in a non-ideological, theoretical fashion: 
 
[A] science never works on an existence whose essence is pure immediacy and singularity 
(“sensations” or “individuals”). It always works on something “general,” even if this has the form of a 
“fact.” . . . [A] science always works on existing concepts. . . . It does not “work” on a purely objective 
“given,” that of pure on absolute “facts.” On the contrary, its particular labor consists of elaborating 
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its own scientific facts through a critique of the ideological “facts” elaborated by an earlier 
ideological theoretical practice. (pp. 183–184) 
 
That is, as the use of certain concepts and forms in the elaboration of scientific facts comes to be 
ideologically inflected (as per Althusser’s consideration of ideology as practice), it becomes 
necessary to engage in the work of explicitly theoretical conceptual refinement in which there is a 
movement away from ideological knowledge toward a theoretically developed problematic. This 
picture of conceptual refinement resonates with Kuhn’s (1996) description of the paradigmatic 
nature of scientific work that can be witnessed in the generation of new scientific disciplines and 
disciplinary problematics. Rather than proceeding as a mode of normal science, guided by existent 
paradigmatic (ideological) disciplinary control, Social Informatics is pushed toward a state of 
constantly revolutionary scientific work, especially as it works to critique the ideological forms of 
computation that (in a reflexive movement) take advantage of the insights developed from Social 
Informatics research. 
 
This revolutionary mode of scientific practice operates within a larger extra-scientific context of 
sociological determinations. Within this constantly developing problematic, Social Informatics works 
in each instance toward a local, rather than universal understanding of computation. This constant 
re-factoring of the problematic functions as a theoretical and conceptual rather than empirical 
practice, one concerned with the definition of the concepts surrounding Social Informatics, up to 
and including the causal connections between technologies, their discourses, social structures, and 
the whole of the historical matrices of which they are a part. This is not to wholly discount 
empirically based observation and argumentation, only to assert the possibility of their ideological 
formulation. Empirical methods, like the ideological movements critiqued by Social Informatics, 
should be thought of as resting on similarly ideological foundations and that their usefulness begins 
and ends with the development of a sufficiently rigorous critical problematic. 
 
By not being concerned with the object of empiricism, but rather with only the object of knowledge 
itself (Poster, 1974), Althusser’s work provides a philosophical conception of how it is possible to 
“specify the gap between ideology and science, the space for critical knowledge, avoiding the 
reduction of science to ideology” (Resch, 1989, p. 536). Upholding the distinction between the 
object of knowledge and the object itself (Althusser, 2005), the critical and scientific stances of Social 
Informatics are able to be reconciled by taking all modes of information (in all its forms, both the 
object and knowledge about the object) as Social Informatics’s proper object of study. 
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This self-reflexive consideration of the status of the discipline of Social Informatics circles back to the 
earlier claim that the tenets of Social Informatics have been sublimated by the very movements that 
it critiques. In addressing the question of the ideology of computerization and dataization 
movements, Social Informatics should also consider its own role in the development of such 
ideologies. That is, Social Informatics today finds itself in a hybrid, if not contradictory, position, both 
critiquing and, through a sublimation of such a critique, providing support for the continuation of 
such ideological movements. In the face of continually developing movements, the central task of 
Social Informatics is to consider its motivating questions in a fashion which likewise opens up new 
modes of critical practice. 
 
Discussion and Implications 
 
Such a re-framing of the theoretical basis for Social Informatics has two important and immediate 
practical implications for the field. First, the work of Social Informatics itself takes on a largely self-
reflexive character, one which stems from the theoretical necessity to reconsider what might be the 
ideological implications of any empirical work. As it is confronted with an ever-shifting field of 
technological action, Social Informatics is forced to engage in a constant reformation of its practices 
and aims in face of the developing ideologies surrounding computerization. This can be particularly 
seen in the way in which the results of the Social Informatics research regarding the development of 
the idea of proper sociotechnical fit have been incorporated, in the manner of a hegemonic 
allowance, into the program of computerization movements. The emergence of ideologies of data 
analytics that are distinct from, yet intimately connected to ideologies of computerization, proves 
another instance pressing for such continual renewal. 
 
Although an explicit call for a constant reformulation of Social Informatics may be novel, in practice, 
such evolution has long been evident. Aspects of this need for self-reflection and conceptual 
redefinition can be seen in Kling’s constantly evolving approach to Social Informatics in response to a 
changing historical and technical setting (Day, 2007). 
 
Second, and more importantly, this Althusserian framing has implications for the ways in which we 
conceive of the ethical nature of the work of Social Informatics. Building on the already quasi-ethical 
ontological position taken by Social Informatics in its denial of a deterministic influence of 
technology and its assertion of the potential for the ethical consequences of the manner in which 
technologies are deployed (Sawyer & Eschenfelder, 2005), an Althusserian turn in the theoretical 
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understanding of Social Informatics presents a view of ethics distinct from the normally humanistic 
value given to such. In this, any work of ethics surrounding Social Informatics should be approached 
not from a position of an ideologically given ethics of a humanist position, but one which is 
formulated in theoretical and more abstract terms (Althusser, 2005). Tracing Althusser’s influence to 
the work of Badiou (Feltham, 2008), it is possible to see how Althusser’s claims regarding a scientific 
theory of history and social structure can provide a foundation for ethical considerations. Though 
separated by several years of conceptual development, Badiou’s approach to a mode of singular 
ethics remains anchored to an Althusserian foundation, aligned along a concern for the production 
of the subject: 
 
If  there  is  no  ethics  “in  general,”  that  is  because  there  is  no abstract Subject, who would 
adopt it as his shield. There is only a particular kind of animal, convoked by certain circumstances to 
become a subject—or rather, to enter into the composing of a subject. (Badiou, 2001, p. 40) 
 
For Badiou, as he works the idea of particular, subjective actions against their universal implications, 
it becomes possible to see the ways in which the existent technological situations with which we are 
involved should be approached. Pointing back to the first implication described, such an ethics 
pushes for a constant re-engagement with and openness to those circumstances that allow for the 
development of subjectivity. As in the early formulation of Social Informatics’s problematic, 
computerization must be understood in local and not universal terms. For Badiou, it is an issue of 
staying true to the events presented to us and not engaging with them in a prefabricated fashion. 
This ethics goads Social Informatics toward the constant reconsideration of both its aims and the 
modes of technological discourses with which it is engaged. 
 
When bringing Althusserian theory to bear on Social Informatics, these twin implications of a 
constant need for critical reflection and ethical engagement are perhaps best tempered by Derrida’s 
critique of the certainty of Althusser’s Marxian presuppositions (Sprinkler, 1993). In pushing away 
from the rigid divide between ideological practices and those deemed theoretically sound, Derrida’s 
weakening of Althusser’s concepts points toward an inde- terminate space in which Social 
Informatics research becomes committed to the uniquely singular event of the confluence of social 
and technical forms with which we are today confronted. In the dissolution of the empirical 
foundation for its research, the judgement of Social Informatics comes to be one always set in the 
present situation in which the research actively comes to terms with the concepts and ideologies as 
they presently are, indeterminate as this may be. In this, the researcher, being presented 
with some system or application of data analysis is called to confront the system and ask what it can 
achieve and what it can mean. This comes as a particular moment of decision, with Social 
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Informatics taking the shape of an ethics concerned more with the question of the purpose of any 
technology than with a mechanical empirical consideration of a narrow range of effects and claims 
as would be analyzed by a solely empirical method. Building on this kind of Aristotelean question of 
how technologies should be seen to contribute to a “good life,” a more lasting ethical import is given 
to Social Informatics in that it resolves to question not only the effectiveness, but the ontological 
and epistemic directions of our technologies and the societal structures in which they are 
embedded. This leads Social Informatics and its consideration of ideology toward a continuing 
decomposition and questioning of its concepts, the relations of ideology to causality, and the larger 
materialities of computer systems themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Social Informatics’s analysis of the ideologies of computerization movements needs to be recast 
today in light of the rise of ideologies of data, which, hand in hand with computerization, push not 
only for the reshaping of social forms, but for a reshaping of how those forms are to be understood. 
Distinct in their concerns, ideologies in support of data analysis have far reaching epistemic and 
ontological implications. By focusing on this material and praxis-based understanding of ideology as 
something which is replicated by individual subjective constitution, it is possible to describe both 
movements of computerization and the ideological movements of dataization that have developed. 
Tracing the connection between subjectivity and ideology weakens Social Informatics’s initial claims 
for a foundational role for empiricism when approaching questions of ideology, and pushes the 
research program in the direction of an ethical and critical practice. In this, Social Informatics is 
pointed toward a task of not only studying the effects of the implementation and use of technology, 
but also of laying a groundwork for the fundamental consideration of how the terms of such a 
discussion are cast. 
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